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Doctors in Attic Forensic Oratory 
Christine Plastow  
N DEMOSTHENES 54 Against Conon, the speaker Ariston con-
trasts his opponents’ witnesses, whom he characterises as co-
conspirators prepared to tell a variety of lies on his enemies’ 
behalf, with his own witnesses, who are doctors (35–36): 
καὶ ταῦτα τὰ λαµπρὰ καὶ νεανικά ἐστιν αὐτῶν “οὐ γὰρ ἡµεῖς 
µαρτυρήσοµεν ἀλλήλοις; οὐ γὰρ ταῦθ᾽ ἑταίρων ἐστὶ καὶ φίλων; 
τί δὲ καὶ δεινόν ἐστιν ὧν παρέξεται κατὰ σοῦ; τυπτόµενόν φασί 
τινες ὁρᾶν; ἡµεῖς δὲ µηδ᾽ ἧφθαι τὸ παράπαν µαρτυρήσοµεν. ἐκ-
δεδύσθαι θοἰµάτιον; τοῦτ᾽ ἐκείνους προτέρους πεποιηκέναι ἡµεῖς 
µαρτυρήσοµεν. τὸ χεῖλος ἐρράφθαι; τὴν κεφαλὴν δέ γ᾽ ἡµεῖς ἢ 
ἕτερόν τι κατεαγέναι φήσοµεν.” ἀλλὰ καὶ µάρτυρας ἰατροὺς 
παρέχοµαι. τοῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, παρὰ τούτοις· 
ὅσα γὰρ µὴ δι᾽ αὑτῶν, οὐδενὸς µάρτυρος καθ᾽ ἡµῶν εὐπορή-
σουσιν.  
And these are their brilliant and spirited attitudes: “For shall we 
not bear witness for each other? Is that not the way of companions 
and friends? And so what is fearful about the charges he has 
brought against you? Some people say they saw him being 
beaten? We will testify that he wasn’t touched at all. That his 
cloak was ripped off? We will testify that they did it to you first. 
That his lip has been stitched up? We will say that your head or 
some other part was broken.” But I also bring doctors as wit-
nesses. This is not, men of the jury, the case with them; for apart 
from as much as comes from themselves, they will not supply a 
single witness against me. 
In this passage a dichotomy of untrustworthy and trustworthy 
testimony is clearly established, even though Ariston provides no 
additional characterisation of his witnesses beyond their pro–
fession. Why is a doctor a particularly credible witness? The 
statement suggests automatic trust in these doctors—perhaps 
due to their professional reputation and expertise, or their lack 
I 
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of personal relationship with the speaker—but there is clearly an 
additional rhetorical element in play. Demosthenes actively 
draws attention to the profession, knowing that it will have a 
certain persuasive effect on the dikasts.  
Although Demosthenes allows for no ambiguity in his positive 
view of doctors in this instance, the same cannot be said for every 
doctor that appears in forensic rhetoric. Here, I survey the ap-
pearances of doctors in Attic forensic oratory with a view both 
to providing a clearer reading of the rhetorical operation of this 
passage, and to elucidating the perceptions and forensic uses of 
doctors in Athenian courts. I begin with a brief examination of 
perceptions of doctors outside of the courts, before addressing in 
turn passages that present figurative doctors, reputable and dis-
reputable doctors who appear in courtroom narratives, and 
doctors brought forth as witnesses during the trial, including 
those in Demosthenes 54.  
Perceptions of doctors in fourth-century Athens 
There were, of course, a variety of types of medical prac-
titioners in fourth-century Greece. Itinerant doctors would likely 
have had to rebuild their reputation in every new town they 
visited, unless they were particularly famous.1 Many cities in-
cluding Athens probably also had ‘public’ doctors, though the 
precise nature of their role is unclear.2 Doctors were unlikely to 
come from an elite background, and this was particularly true of 
the fourth century in Athens, when the salary for a public doctor 
was still relatively modest.3 The idea is asserted in Plato’s Gorgias 
(445B) that doctors should be seen as equivalent to skilled crafts-
 
1 L. Edelstein, Ancient Medicine (Baltimore 1967) 87–91; G. E. R. Lloyd, 
Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle (London 1970) 52. 
2 Lloyd, Early Greek Science 51–52. 
3 V. Nutton, Ancient Medicine (London 2004) 259. Ar. Plut. 408 may refer to 
public doctors and indicate that in the fourth century Athens could no longer 
afford to support many of them: τίς δῆτ᾽ ἰατρός ἐστι νῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὔτε 
γὰρ ὁ µισθὸς οὐδὲν ἔστ᾽ οὔθ᾽ ἡ τέχνη, “What doctor is there in the city now? 
Where there’s no pay, there’s no craft.” However, this may simply refer to 
doctors in general. 
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men.4 At Athens, many doctors would be foreigners, and would 
therefore have a naturally lower status than Athenian citizens.5 
A few doctors may have made enough money to become rich, 
though this became more common in the Hellenistic period; 
otherwise, the majority of physicians would have earned enough 
money to live on, as would most working people. 
The Hippocratic Oath suggests that at least some doctors 
operated under a code of ethics, but the question which doctors 
actually took the oath remains unanswered. It has recently been 
suggested that the ethical section of the oath may not in fact be 
as old as the first section;6 indeed, the ethics espoused in it are at 
odds with other evidence, and as Lloyd and Sivin note, “plenty 
of evidence shows doctors, both Hippocratic writers and others, 
breaking both the spirit and the letter of the injunctions [the 
oath] contains and getting away with it.”7 The phrasing of the 
oath’s exhortation not to do harm, which also appears in the 
Epidemics, makes it clear that the Hippocratic writers were aware 
of the danger that incorrect medical treatments could pose to 
patients.8 Doctors who failed to treat a patient successfully could 
easily be represented as incompetent, as seen in Antiphon’s third 
Tetralogy (e.g. 2.4), and doctors may have refused to treat patients 
if they were not sure they could help them, in order to avoid 
getting a reputation for being ineffective.9 The tract On Ancient 
 
4 See H. W. Pleket, “The Social Status of Physicians in the Greco-Roman 
World,” Clio medica 27 (1995) 27–34; Edelstein, Ancient Medicine 87. 
5 Edelstein, Ancient Medicine 87 n.2.  
6 C. Tolsa, “On the Origins of the Hippocratic Oath,” GRBS 59 (2019) 614–
638. 
7 G. Lloyd and N. Sivin, The Way and the Word: Science and Medicine in Early 
China and Greece (New Haven 2002) 112. 
8 P. J. ver der Eijk, Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and 
Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease (Cambridge 2005) 101. 
9 Edelstein, Ancient Medicine 96–97; P. Prioreschi, “Did the Hippocratic 
Physician Treat Hopeless Cases?” Gesnerus 49 (1992) 341–349. Note, how-
ever, that doctors would also not necessarily have denied patients palliative 
care: see H. von Staden, “Incurability and Hopelessness: The Hippocratic 
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Medicine makes it explicit that not all doctors had the same level 
of skill and knowledge, and that some were simply better at their 
jobs than others (Hippoc. VM 1.11–19).  
Given their training, however, it is likely that many doctors 
would have been respected individually in their communities as 
skilled practitioners, so long as the care and the treatments they 
provided were generally successful, or at least appeared to be 
thorough.10 It is certain that reputable practitioners did have 
training and knowledge beyond that of the average person. 
Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium clearly speaks from a position 
of learned knowledge and ‘scientific’ expertise.11 The Hip-
pocratic writers saw their work as a technē, implying learned 
knowledge and skill. Plato includes medicine as one of the technai 
in the Gorgias, and speaks highly of its value.12 Indeed, Plato’s 
generally quite positive characterisation of medicine and its 
practitioners could be taken as representative of their status and 
reception in fourth-century Athens. Several points, however, 
should be noted in this regard. First, the content of the Hip-
pocratic On the Art, a defence against detractors of the medical 
profession, makes it clear that such detractors did exist, and that 
doctors were at pains to justify the necessity and quality of their 
work (De arte 1.21–25).13 Second, the evidence in the Hippocratic 
texts of people pretending to be doctors (e.g. Decent. 2–3, Lex 1) 
 
Corpus,” in P. Potter (ed.), La maladie et les maladies dans la collection hippocratique 
(Quebec 1990) 75–112. 
10 See e.g. Pl. Grg. 514D–E, which suggests that it would be ridiculous to 
attempt to work successfully as a doctor without an adequate track-record of 
good results. 
11 On the scientific and philosophical wisdom of Eryximachus’ speech see 
G. A. Scott and W. A. Welton, Erotic Wisdom: Philosophy and Intermediacy in 
Plato’s Symposium (Albany 2008) 56–63. 
12 Plato does not, however, rate medicine quite so highly as those technai 
that deal with the preservation and improvement of the soul, or even as highly 
as gymnastics, as he seems to prioritise maintaining the body over restoring 
it; see S. B. Levin, Plato’s Rivalry with Medicine: A Struggle and its Dissolution (Ox-
ford 2014) 20. 
13 See E. D. Phillips, Aspects of Greek Medicine (London/Sydney 1973) 39–40. 
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is echoed in Plato, for example in the Charmides, which suggests 
that there were at the very least unscrupulous people mas-
querading as doctors (though Plato would not characterise them 
as ‘true doctors’: Chrm. 170E). Third, as Levin notes, Plato’s 
positive presentation of physicians is “a normative claim about 
the enterprise at its best, not a descriptive one about how all 
doctors already function.”14 Competent doctors, then, could 
expect to garner respect from their patients, and doctors as a 
category may have been generally perceived as trustworthy, 
though it is clear that opinions of individual practitioners could 
deviate from this if they did not do their work well. 
Figurative doctors 
The archetypal nature of doctors means that they appear with 
some regularity in figures of speech in the Attic orators. In 
several instances, we find figurative doctors portrayed in a 
positive light and equated to figures with various civic duties. In 
Isocrates 8.40, a comparison is drawn between doctors and 
speakers who give necessary but perhaps unpleasant advice: 
καταγέλαστόν ἐστι τὰς µὲν καύσεις καὶ τὰς τοµὰς τῶν ἰατρῶν 
ὑποµένειν, ἵνα πλειόνων ἀλγηδόνων ἀπαλλαγῶµεν, τοὺς δὲ 
λόγους ἀποδοκιµάζειν πρὶν εἰδέναι σαφῶς εἰ τοιαύτην ἔχουσι 
τὴν δύναµιν ὥστ᾽ ὠφελῆσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας.  
It is ridiculous to submit to the burns and cuts of the doctor, in 
order that we may be released from greater pains, but to reject 
speeches before knowing clearly if they have the power to help 
those who hear them. 
In this analogy, those who heal the body are equated to those 
who ‘heal’ the city; although both processes may be painful, the 
results will be beneficial. This suggests a view of doctors who 
know what is best for their patients, even if it may seem un-
pleasant at the time, and therefore characterises them as skilled 
and compassionate professionals. Such a figurative construction 
also suggests trust in the doctor who has such specialist knowl-
edge, and by extension trust in the politician who also, through 
experience, knows what is good for the city and has its best 
 
14 Levin, Plato’s Rivalry 18 n.39. 
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interests at heart. Surgery is depicted as the doctor’s method of 
healing: by comparison, the good politician’s methods may also 
appear invasive and extreme in order to improve the city’s situ-
ation. The suggestion that people readily submit to the doctor 
but not to the politician paints a picture of a professional who is 
automatically trusted to be doing the right thing—unlike the 
rhetor, perhaps. 
Another doctor who employs surgical techniques appears in a 
simile at Demosthenes 25.95, in this case equated not to the 
speaker but to the jury in the present court case: 
δεῖ δὴ πάντας, ὥσπερ οἱ ἰατροί, ὅταν καρκίνον ἢ φαγέδαιναν ἢ 
τῶν ἀνιάτων τι κακῶν ἴδωσιν, ἀπέκαυσαν ἢ ὅλως ἀπέκοψαν, 
οὕτω τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον ὑµᾶς ἐξορίσαι, ῥῖψαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, 
ἀνελεῖν, µὴ περιµείναντάς τι παθεῖν, ὃ µήτ᾽ ἰδίᾳ µήτε δηµοσίᾳ 
γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ προευλαβηθέντας. 
Indeed it is necessary that, just as doctors, whenever they find a 
cancer or tumour or some incurable ill, burn or cut it away com-
pletely, so you all should banish this beast from you, cast him from 
the city, do away with him; do not wait for something to happen, 
which may befall individuals or the people, but take precautions.  
The doctor and the jury are presented as protective forces 
removing an evil from the body or the city, which is at risk of 
destruction in both cases. Here, the visceral nature of surgery 
reflects the ruthlessness and permanence with which the per-
petrator of crime should be removed from the city. The de-
liberative nature of the court, when equated with the medical 
profession, suggests that both doctors and dikasts are expected 
to draw on knowledge and experience in order to make such a 
‘life-saving’ decision. In Demosthenes 26.26, the doctor’s ability 
to diagnose and heal the body is contrasted with that of the 
legislator to do the same for the psychē by making criminal acts, 
which presumably are implied here to reflect a diseased mind, 
illegal.15 Once again, both the doctor and the legislator have 
 
15 τὰ µὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώµασιν ἀρρωστήµατα τοῖς τῶν ἰατρῶν εὑρήµασι 
καταπαύεται, τὰς δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀγριότητας αἱ τῶν νοµοθετῶν ἐξορίζουσι 
διάνοιαι, “For the sicknesses of the body are ended by the discoveries of the 
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specialist knowledge, and both have the best interests of their 
‘patient’ at heart. In Demosthenes 18.243, too, a doctor is 
employed as a simile for the orator working to save the city; in 
this instance, the idea of a doctor withholding the method of 
treatment until after the patient has died is presented as equally 
ridiculous as the orator failing to inform the people of the best 
course until after a calamity has struck.16 In this case, the doctor 
and the rhetor are expected to have a preventative role in the 
face of mortal danger. 
Thus all of our figurative doctors in the forensic speeches are 
presented as having specialist knowledge and using it to heal 
their patients and save them from death; the idea of them not 
doing so appears absurd. This is not especially surprising: as an 
archetype, we might expect to see doctors presented as wanting 
the best for their patients and using their expertise to achieve it. 
It is useful, though, to compare two other sources, not examples 
of forensic oratory but related to the genre, that expand this 
metaphorical view of doctors.17 First, in the Third Olynthiac (33), 
Demosthenes compares the non-committal actions of the dēmos 
to the diet prescribed by doctors which neither restores the 
 
doctors, but savagery in the soul is banished by the intentions of the legis-
lators.” 
16 ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ἀσθενοῦσι µὲν τοῖς κάµνουσιν εἰσιὼν µὴ λέγοι 
µηδὲ δεικνύοι δι᾽ ὧν ἀποφεύξονται τὴν νόσον, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τελευτήσειέ τις 
αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ νοµιζόµεν᾽ αὐτῷ φέροιτο, ἀκολουθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ µνῆµα διεξίοι “εἰ 
τὸ καὶ τὸ ἐποίησεν ἅνθρωπος οὑτοσί, οὐκ ἂν ἀπέθανεν.” ἐµβρόντητε, εἶτα νῦν 
λέγεις, “It is as if a doctor going about his work with the sick should neither 
speak nor show how to be rid of the illness, but when they have died and the 
customs have been observed, he should follow along to the tomb expounding 
‘if the man had done this and that, he would not have died’. What insanity, 
to talk now!” 
17 More general medical language is also employed in the deliberative 
speeches; on this see C. W. Wooten, “Unnoticed Medical Language in 
Demosthenes,” Hermes 107 (1979) 157–60; A. E. Das, “Health, Harm, and 
the Civic Body: Medical Language in the Speeches of Demosthenes,” GRBS 
59 (2019) 340–367. 
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patient’s strength nor allows him to die.18 At first glance this 
suggests an unscrupulous doctor, perhaps extending the length 
of his patient’s suffering in order to receive more pay. But in light 
of the analogy with the dēmos, the comparison in fact implies a 
more apathetic figure, who cannot or will not commit to either 
course of action. Either way, this figurative doctor appears to be 
an unreliable figure, rather different from the doctors used in 
analogies in the courts.  
Second, we can consider the doctor in Antiphon’s hypo-
thetical third Tetralogy. The speakers debate whether the victim 
died at the hands of his alleged violent attacker, or of the doctor 
under whose care he was placed. At Antiphon 4.2.4 the de-
fendants cast doubt on the competence of the doctor: the patient 
has died, they argue, not as the result of the wounds the 
defendant inflicted, but because the doctor carried out an un-
successful course of treatment which he was advised by other 
doctors would endanger the patient’s life.19 The scenario is 
hypothetical and highly rhetorical, and Antiphon has his de-
fendant go into exile voluntarily after his first speech, suggesting 
that his case may be rather weak. Nevertheless, we are left with 
the suggestion that incompetent as well as competent doctors 
could have a role to play in a court case, and that opinions could 
 
18 τῶν τοιούτων ληµµάτων ἀπαλλαγείητε, ἃ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσι παρὰ τῶν 
ἰατρῶν σιτίοις διδοµένοις ἔοικε. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖν᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἰσχὺν ἐντίθησιν οὔτ᾽ 
ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐᾷ· καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ἃ νέµεσθε νῦν ὑµεῖς, οὔτε τοσαῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὥστ᾽ 
ὠφέλειαν ἔχειν τινὰ διαρκῆ, οὔτ᾽ ἀπογνόντας ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἐᾷ, “you may 
be delivered of these profits, which are like the diet given to the sick by the 
doctors. For they neither put strength into the patient nor allow him to die; 
and these [profits] that you now deal out neither are so great as to be sufficient 
to help you, nor allow you to give them up and try something else.” 
19 νῦν δὲ πολλαῖς ἡµέραις ὕστερον µοχθηρῷ ἰατρῷ ἐπιτρεφθεὶς διὰ τὴν τοῦ 
ἰατροῦ µοχθηρίαν καὶ οὐ διὰ τὰς πληγὰς ἀπέθανε. προλεγόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ 
τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν, εἰ ταύτην τὴν θεραπείαν θεραπεύσοιτο, ὅτι ἰάσιµος ὢν 
διαφθαρήσοιτο, “but as it is, a few days later, having been entrusted to an 
inferior doctor, he died due to the doctor’s incompetence, and not due to the 
blows. For other doctors informed this doctor beforehand that, if he followed 
this course of treatment, despite being curable, the [patient] would die.” 
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differ between medical practitioners to the extent that patients 
might live or die as a result. 
Reputable doctors 
In Demosthenes 47, the speaker accuses the defendants of 
having badly beaten an old freedwoman of his household in an 
attempt to steal his property; the woman later died of her 
wounds. Before she died, the speaker says that he demanded that 
the men provide a doctor to care for the woman, but that when 
they would not do so, he had to bring in a doctor himself (47.67): 
ἐγὼ αὐτὸς εἰσήγαγον ἰατρὸν ᾧ πολλὰ ἔτη ἐχρώµην, ὃς ἐθεράπευεν 
αὐτὴν ἀρρωστοῦσαν, καὶ ἐπέδειξα ὡς εἶχεν, εἰσαγαγὼν µάρτυ-
ρας. ἀκούσας δὲ τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔτι εἴη ἡ ἄνθρωπος, πάλιν 
ἑτέρους µάρτυρας παραλαβὼν τήν τε ἄνθρωπον ἐπέδειξα ὡς 
εἶχεν, καὶ ἐπήγγειλα τούτοις θεραπεύειν. 
I myself brought in a doctor, whom I had consulted regularly for 
many years, and he cared for her while she was unwell, and I 
showed him the state she was in, and brought witnesses. And 
when I heard from the doctor that the woman did not have long 
to live, again I took other witnesses, showed them the state the 
woman was in, and called on these men to care for her. 
Like the doctor in Demosthenes 54, this doctor is able to give the 
prognosis that his patient is likely to die. What is of particular 
interest in this passage is the relationship between the doctor and 
the multiple witnesses called in by the speaker. The doctor is 
brought in to care for the woman, and presumably makes the 
pronouncement that she will shortly die on the basis of his pro-
fessional knowledge. But the speaker also summons additional 
witnesses, both when the doctor is initially brought in, and when 
he makes the final prognosis; we must assume that at the start 
the speaker was already preparing to take legal action against his 
opponents, and that he called in these extra witnesses in antici-
pation of their later being able to appear in court to support his 
case. It seems that there was a perceived benefit to bolstering the 
word of the doctor with that of other men to prepare for the 
potential necessity of evidence in future legal proceedings. In-
deed, this description is immediately followed by the testimony 
of witnesses, though it is interesting to note that it is not specified 
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whether the doctor himself was included. Although it might ap-
pear that his inclusion as a witness would have bolstered the 
speaker’s case, presumably testifying to a person’s death did not 
require the same level of medical expertise as testifying to how 
close a person came to dying, as in Demosthenes 54. 
Another reputable doctor is the one in [Dem.] 40, who is 
allegedly asked to act unscrupulously in his role as a medical 
professional, but rejects and exposes the plot. The speaker Man-
titheus’ opponent and half-brother, Boeotus (also known as 
Mantitheus, the dispute about the name being the subject of the 
case in Dem. 39), allegedly concocted a false charge of trauma, 
wounding, against Mantitheus and brought him to trial before 
the Areopagus. The full charge must have been dikē traumatos ek 
pronoias, an indictment for wounding “with premeditation,” the 
only type of wounding charge tried by the Areopagus. The pre-
cise meaning of “premeditation” in this instance is unclear, but 
bringing the charge at the ancestral court for homicide suggests 
that it may imply, if not actual attempted homicide, at least 
severe wounding that had the potential to kill.20 If so, this is 
exactly the kind of case that may have benefited from the 
opinion of someone with medical expertise, though there is no 
sign of a doctor in our only extant speeches from trials for trauma, 
Lysias 3 and 4.  
In order to carry out his plot, Mantitheus says, Boeotus made 
a cut on his own head and passed it off as a wound inflicted by 
Mantitheus. A doctor whom he had tried to bring into the plot 
went to the Areopagus and revealed everything (40.33): 
καὶ εἰ µὴ Εὐθύδικος ὁ ἰατρός, πρὸς ὃν οὗτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἦλθον 
δεόµενοι ἐπιτεµεῖν τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου 
βουλὴν εἶπεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν, τοιαύτην ἂν δίκην οὗτος 
εἰλήφει παρ᾽ ἐµοῦ τοῦ µηδὲν ἀδικοῦντος, ἣν ὑµεῖς οὐδὲ κατὰ τῶν 
τὰ µέγιστ᾽ ἀδικούντων ὑµᾶς ἐπιχειρήσαιτ᾽ ἂν ποιήσασθαι.  
And if Euthydicus the doctor, to whom these men went at first to 
ask him to cut [Boeotus’] head, had not told the Areopagus coun-
cil the whole truth, this man would have taken such vengeance on 
 
20 C. Carey, Lysias: Selected Speeches (Cambridge 1989) 109.  
 CHRISTINE PLASTOW 585 
————— 
Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 59 (2019) 575–595 
 
 
 
 
me, who had done him no injustice, as you would not carry out 
against those who had inflicted the greatest of injustices on you. 
In the case of a successful conviction for trauma, Mantitheus 
may have been liable to so severe a penalty as exile, as he notes 
at 40.32; thus, he implies, the doctor’s statement saved him from 
a terrible fate. Euthydicus not only rejected being part of the 
plot, but was willing to expose the wrongdoing of the plotters. 
The statement that the doctor delivered his information to the 
Areopagus council suggests that it was probably delivered in the 
form of witness testimony during the false prosecution, rather 
than during a pre-trial stage, which would not have involved the 
whole council.21 It is worth noting that the doctor’s testimony 
would not have required his professional expertise: he does not 
testify to medical matters, but to the fact that he was allegedly 
asked to make the cut by Boeotus and his co-conspirators.22 In 
giving the testimony, though, he may have sought to protect his 
professional reputation. Either way, he is clearly presented in the 
rhetoric as an upstanding and honest character, and a foil to the 
plotters seeking unfairly to convict Mantitheus. The incident 
also suggests that he would have had the necessary knowledge to 
make a cut on someone’s head that was presumably intended to 
look impressive while causing no serious damage. 
Disreputable doctors 
If Euthydicus was able successfully to defend his reputation in 
347, it did not remain untarnished for long.23 In Aeschines 
 
21 D. M. MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator (Oxford 2009) 78. There is no 
indication in the text that the doctor also appeared as a witness in the present 
trial. 
22 Contra Hall’s implication that the doctor here is a ‘medical expert’ called 
to testify to the state of the litigant’s wounds: E. Hall, “Lawcourt Dramas: 
The Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory,” BICS 40 (1995) 39–
58, at 53. 
23 On the date of [Dem.] 40 see C. Carey and R. A. Reid, Demosthenes: 
Selected Private Speeches (Cambridge 1985) 160. 
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Against Timarchus, delivered in 346/5,24 Euthydicus reappears as 
the owner of a house in Piraeus where Timarchus stayed as a 
young man, and in which he allegedly set up trade as a prostitute 
while pretending to be a student of the doctor’s (Aeschin. 1.40).25 
No explicitly negative language is applied to the doctor in this 
instance, and it is not immediately clear from Aeschines’ narra-
tive whether Euthydicus was aware of or involved in Timarchus’ 
alleged activities. The doctor himself does not appear as a wit-
ness, though another witness is brought forth who seemingly tes-
tified to having a relationship with Timarchus while Timarchus 
was living with Euthydicus. Mentioning the doctor’s house as the 
location of illicit activity, however, would surely have cast the 
doctor in a negative light, and, if Euthydicus was aware of 
Timarchus’ activities, even implicitly placed him in the category 
of pimp or brothel keeper; at the very least, it might be inferred 
that the doctor condoned Timarchus’ activities and perhaps pur-
chased his services.26 Later in the speech (124) Aeschines justifies 
calling those locations where Timarchus lived brothels by the 
analogy that “if a doctor moves into one of the shops on a street, 
it is called a surgery.”27 This could be passed off as purely 
 
24 On the date of Aeschin. 1 see C. Carey, Aeschines (Austin 2000) 19. 
25 οὗτος γὰρ πάντων µὲν πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ ἀπηλλάγη ἐκ παίδων, ἐκάθητο ἐν 
Πειραιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ Εὐθυδίκου ἰατρείου, προφάσει µὲν τῆς τέχνης µαθητής, τῇ 
δ᾽ ἀληθείᾳ πωλεῖν αὑτὸν προῃρηµένος, ὡς αὐτὸ τοὖργον ἔδειξεν, “For this 
man, first of all, when he was rid of his youth, set up in Piraeus at the house 
of Euthydicus the doctor, ostensibly as a student of the craft, but in truth 
choosing deliberately to sell himself, as the event showed.” On the identifica-
tion of Euthydicus see N. Fisher, Aeschines Against Timarchos (Oxford 2001) 169. 
26 Fisher, Aeschines Against Timarchos 169, is explicit about the negative 
implications for the doctor: “Aeschines … allows the clear implication that 
[Euthydicus] was happy to let Timarchos act as a prostitute in his house/ 
surgery, had wide contacts, and presumably was in fact acting as pimp as well 
as lover.” 
27 ἐὰν δ᾽ εἰς ἓν δήπου τούτων τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐργαστηρίων ἰατρὸς 
εἰσοικίσηται, ἰατρεῖον καλεῖται· ἐὰν δ᾽ µὲν ἐξοικίσηται, εἰς δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο 
ἐργαστήριον χαλκεὺς εἰσοικίσηται, χαλκεῖον ἐκλήθη, ἐὰν δὲ κναφεύς, κνα-
φεῖον, ἐὰν δὲ τέκτων, τεκτονεῖον· ἐὰν δὲ πορνοβοσκὸς καὶ πόρναι, ἀπὸ τῆς 
ἐργασίας αὐτῆς ἐκλήθη πορνεῖον, “If it happens that a doctor establishes 
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figurative language, intended to set up an effective rhetorical 
dichotomy between a reputable and a disreputable person and 
location, though it is surely no accident that one of Timarchus’ 
‘brothels’ was indeed a doctor’s surgery. Although the house of 
Euthydicus is not explicitly called a brothel, the astute juror may 
have noticed this parallel and further understood Euthydicus as 
someone involved in Timarchus’ sexual activities. This reading 
gives an additional angle to the appearance of Euthydicus in 
[Dem.] 40: we might imagine that, if Euthydicus was chosen by 
Boeotus to take part in his plot, he may have already been known 
to be associated with the more disreputable elements in Athens, 
and thus his refusal to participate in the plot may have cast 
Boeotus in an even more negative light, being too corrupt even 
for this crooked doctor. If Euthydicus did indeed have such a 
reputation, it may be for this reason that the logographer of 
[Dem.] 40 says little else about him. 
In Demosthenes 33.18, the speaker alleges that one of the men 
who has played a role in concocting a plot to bring a false charge 
against him is a doctor, Eryxias.28 Like Euthydicus, though, his 
corrupt behaviour is not linked directly to his profession. In fact, 
he is rhetorically grouped with a number of disreputable figures, 
and seems to be presented as one of the crowd, though his 
specific identification as a doctor may have had the effect of 
heightening the shock value of his activities. In a more pro-
fessional context, Demosthenes in 19.124 may cast doubt on the 
integrity of Aeschines’ doctor.29 Demosthenes alleges that, when 
 
himself in one of the shops on a street, it is called a surgery; but if he moves 
out and a smith moves in, it is called a smithy, and if a fuller, a fuller’s shop, 
and if a carpenter, a carpenter’s shop; and if a pimp and prostitutes, from this 
business it is called a brothel.” 
28 ὁ δὲ ταῦτα κατασκευάζων ἦν Ἐρυξίας ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁ ἐκ Πειραιῶς, “The one 
who constructed this [plot] was Eryxias the doctor from Piraeus.” 
29 ἔδει δὲ µένειν. πῶς οὖν; ἀρρωστεῖν προφασίζεται, καὶ λαβὼν Ἐξήκεστον 
τὸν ἰατρὸν ἁδελφὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ προσελθὼν τῇ βουλῇ ἐξώµοσεν ἀρρωστεῖν 
τουτονὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐχειροτονήθη, “But it was necessary to stay. How? He 
made the excuse that he was ill, and, taking Execestus the doctor, his brother 
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he himself chose to remain in Athens when the third embassy 
was selected to be sent to Philip, Aeschines also desired to remain 
in order to block Demosthenes if he attempted to persuade the 
Athenians to change their course of action in an extraordinary 
meeting of the assembly. Aeschines could not reject the appoint-
ment without reason, and so Demosthenes implies that he 
concocted a tale of illness, and his brother took Aeschines’ doctor 
Execestus to the council in order to support the claim. The 
suggestion here is that the doctor was in on the plot, and willing 
to testify falsely to Aeschines’ illness in front of the council. For 
Aeschines’ part, he claims that he was ill when initially appointed 
to the embassy but accepted the role so long as he was strong 
enough; it transpired that when the embassy was ready to set 
out, he was too unwell, and that he in fact sent the doctor with 
his brother in order simply to inform the council of the situation 
(Aeschin. 2.94–95).30 Both Demosthenes and Aeschines do por-
tray the doctor as a necessary professional in testifying to the 
severity of an illness, as in Demosthenes 54, though in this case 
to the council rather than in the courtroom. 
Doctors as witnesses 
All of the doctors examined up to this point have been meta-
phorical or narrative figures, who were not necessarily present 
in the courtroom. We do, however, have a few surviving 
examples of doctors who appeared as witnesses in the course of 
a trial. A possible doctor as witness can be found in Demosthenes 
30, where a witness is brought forth to testify that a man named 
Aphobus was with a certain woman during an illness, as evi-
dence that the two are openly living as a couple. The witness, 
 
went before the council and swore in excuse that he was ill, and was ap-
pointed to the office himself.” 
30 πρὸς δὲ τὴν βουλὴν ἀπιόντων τῶν συµπρέσβεων τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν 
ἐµαυτοῦ καὶ τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν ἔπεµψα, οὐκ ἐξοµουµένους· οὐδὲ 
γὰρ ὁ νόµος ἐᾷ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ δήµου χειροτονίας ἐν τῇ βουλῇ ἐξόµνυσθαι· ἀλλὰ 
τὴν ἀρρωστίαν µου δηλώσοντας, “I sent before the council, as the embassy 
was setting out, my brother and my nephew and the doctor, not to swear in 
excuse; for the law does not allow those elected by the dēmos to swear in excuse 
before the council; but to declare my illness.” 
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one Pasiphon, is not described explicitly as a doctor (iatros); 
rather it is said that he was the one who “was caring for” her 
(therapeuōn) in her illness. Pasiphon does not seem to testify to any 
medical matters, but rather the co-habitation of the couple, and 
nothing more is said about his role in this case. 
Apart from Demosthenes 54, we have one other reference to 
doctors apparently acting as witnesses in a way that requires 
their medical knowledge. It appears in Lysias fr.20a Carey, from 
the speech Against Antigenes Concerning Abortion (or simply On the 
Abortion). The fragment, from an anonymous prolegomenon to 
Hermogenes’ Staseis, notes that in the speech Lysias tries to 
establish the foetus as a living thing, and so repeatedly says 
ὥσπερ οἱ ἰατροὶ καὶ αἱ µαῖαι ἀπεφήναντο. Todd accurately 
translates this “as the doctors and the midwives made clear.”31 
Kapparis translates “as the doctors and the midwives have 
stated,” and characterises this as courtroom testimony delivered 
by doctors based on “their own professional opinion as well as 
that of some midwives with whom they had a consultation before 
appearing as witnesses.”32 Pepe also refers to “depositions” 
here.33 Gernet and Bizos use the softer language of “opinion” 
(“l’avis”), though they describe the reference to doctors and 
midwives as a “chose d’autant plus notable que l’idée propre de 
l’expertise est une rareté dans la procedure grecque.”34 This is 
far from a certain reference to the presence of medical pro-
fessionals in the courtroom acting as ‘expert’ witnesses. No 
explicit reference to the legal language of witness testimony 
(µαρτυρία) is preserved. Of 27 other uses of forms of ἀποφαίνω 
besides this one in the forensic corpus of Lysias (excluding two 
fragmentary uses where the meaning cannot be verified), none 
refers explicitly to the delivery of witness testimony or to any 
 
31 S. Todd, “Lysias on Abortion,” Symposion 1999 (Cologne 2003) 255. 
32 K. Kapparis, Abortion in the Ancient World (London 2002) 188. 
33 L. Pepe, “Abortion in Ancient Greece,” Symposion 2013 (Vienna 2014) 
52. 
34 L. Gernet and M. Bizos, Lysias. Discours II (Paris 1989 [1926]) 240. 
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kind of ‘statement’; the closest to this in uses of the verb is in 
denoting the showing, demonstrating, or proving of some 
general argument in a forensic speech.35 Even if we do interpret 
this phrase as referring to courtroom testimony, the witnesses 
themselves present a problem: midwives, presumably female, 
would have been disqualified from giving testimony in the 
courtroom.36 To group the doctors and midwives together, then, 
presents several possibilities: (a) the doctors testified on behalf of 
themselves and the midwives on the grounds of medical knowl-
edge; (b) there were doctors and midwives present at the delivery 
of the aborted foetus in this instance, who noted its state of 
development, and that doctors or others present testified to this 
(i.e. to what they saw, the traditional content of the witness state-
ment)37 in the courtroom; (c) the phrase represents knowledge, 
perhaps in the Hippocratic texts or similar, generally held by 
doctors and midwives. The question cannot be resolved for 
certain given the fragmentary nature of the speech, though the 
 
35 Besides this, the most common use of the verb is to refer to “exposing” 
the bad or illegal behaviour of the opposing litigant or one of his associates. 
Two uses in Lys.12.86 present (hypothetical) witnesses as the subject of the 
verb, but the meaning is clearly one of misrepresentation, or making some-
thing “appear” to be the case. 
36 On women’s inability to deliver testimony themselves and the possibility 
of the submission of their testimony to the court by a man, see R. Just, Women 
in Athenian Law and Life (London 1989) 33–39; M. Gagarin, “Women in 
Athenian Courts,” Dike 1 (1998) 41–45. 
37 See G. Thür, “The Role of Witnesses in Athenian Law,” in M. Gagarin 
et al. (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (Cambridge 2006) 
153; D. Mirhady, “Athens’ Democratic Witnesses,” Phoenix 56 (2002) 262–
263. For an argument constructing the role of this ‘truth-telling’ around the 
movement of conflict resolution away from community arbitration and into 
more centralised litigation, which posits witnesses as a way of bringing com-
munity knowledge into the courtroom, see S. Humphreys, “Social Relations 
on Stage: Witnesses in Classical Athens,” History and Anthropology 1 (1985) 313–
369. For an alternative view on the role of witnesses, which understands them 
in a social model as primarily playing a status-based role in the courtroom, 
see S. Todd, “The Purpose of Evidence in Athenian Courts,” in P. Cartledge 
et al. (eds.), Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society (Cambridge 1990) 
19–39. 
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instance is certainly less compelling than the testimony of 
Ariston’s doctor. 
Thus we return to Demosthenes 54. The speech documents 
the speaker Ariston’s charge against Conon for an alleged 
violent assault. Ariston claims that he suffered such great wounds 
at the hands of Conon that his life was in danger; he opens his 
speech with the assertion that “none of my relatives or doctors 
thought that I would survive” (54.1). In narrating the attack, he 
notes that a doctor was called to examine and treat him. It is 
presumably the same doctor who is called as a witness during 
the trial. The discrepancy between the plural “doctors” in the 
opening and the singular “doctor” in the narrative and when 
introducing the witness statements is ambiguous; the plural is 
also repeated at 36, where Ariston asserts that he “brings doctors 
as witnesses.” As Carey and Reid note (Demosthenes 84),  
it would seem that either only one doctor attended him, and he 
seeks to strengthen his case by exaggerating the number of expert 
judgements on the seriousness of his condition, or several doctors 
attended him, only one of whom was convinced that Ariston was 
close to death.  
But these are not the only options: it may also be the case that 
one of Ariston’s doctors was either disqualified from acting as a 
witness, or had left Athens by the time of the trial; or, indeed, 
that the two witness statements were delivered by two different 
doctors. If the two witness statements at 10 and 12 were given 
by the same doctor, the statement at 36 would be inaccurate. It 
may refer to the testimony of witnesses presented immediately 
afterwards in 36, but these are not explicitly identified as state-
ments made by doctors, as the other statements in the speech 
are. It could also be simple exaggeration, though the lie would 
be easily spotted by the jurors. Whether the two statements were 
given by the same doctor or different ones should make little 
difference to the interpretation of the effects of their statements, 
though the question cannot be resolved.  
The content of the first statement is not immediately clear, but 
it may attest to the fact that the doctor in question saw Ariston, 
surrounded by his friends, in the immediate aftermath of the 
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alleged assault, and that he treated him (54.11–12). This state-
ment speaks quite simply to the facts as the doctor witnessed 
them. The second statement, however, relies on professional 
knowledge. Ariston says that the doctor noted superficial 
bruising, but was concerned by the “great and terrible pains” 
throughout Ariston’s body and particularly in the chest and 
stomach. The exact nature of the illness is hard to determine 
from the text, but whatever it was, Ariston notes that the doctor 
believed that it was only a spontaneous discharge of blood, 
perhaps coughed up, that saved Ariston from dying as a result of 
his internal injuries.38 The witness statement appears after this 
description, and is introduced as testimony to the fact that the 
men’s attack caused such a severe sickness that Ariston almost 
died. The doctor’s statement appears to have been accompanied 
by statements from others who attended Ariston in his sickness. 
This second statement speaks to the idea that the doctor could 
assess the severity of Ariston’s wounds, presumably because he 
was an experienced professional and as a result of his expert 
examination of his patient. This statement has even been in-
terpreted as a precursor to expert testimony, although no such 
concept seems to have existed formally in Athenian law.39 
 
38 Carey and Reid, Demosthenes 85, interpret the illness as “either a pneu-
monic infection resulting indirectly from beating or exposure (depending on 
the time of year at which the incident took place) or direct injury to a lung 
resulting from the blows, such as a broken rib puncturing and collapsing a 
lung.” The second interpretation seems more compatible with the description 
of the sudden discharge of blood. 
39 Bonner, in his seminal work on Athenian evidence, follows Lipsius that 
“the Orators were unconscious of the difference between an expert and a 
regular witness”: R. J. Bonner, Evidence in Athenian Courts (Chicago 1905) 79–
80). Harrison agrees that “expert evidence by such witnesses as doctors hardly 
formed a special category”: A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens II Procedure 
(Oxford 1971) 134. Wolpert and Kapparis call the use of expert witnesses 
“fairly uncommon” but regard the Against Conon as an “important source for 
understanding the use of expert witnesses”: A. Wolpert and K. Kapparis, 
Legal Speeches of Democratic Athens: Sources for Athenian History (Indianapolis 2011) 
xxvii, 174. Amundsen and Ferngren call the doctor’s testimony here “nothing 
less than the testimony of the physician qua physician”: D. W. Amundsen and 
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On the two occasions when the doctor’s testimony is intro-
duced, it is clearly distinguished from that of the other witnesses. 
Dem. 54.10: 
λάβ᾽ οὖν καὶ τὰς τούτων µαρτυρίας, ἵν᾽ εἰδῆθ᾽ ὅτι πολλοὶ 
συνίσασιν ὡς ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίσθην. “Μαρτυρίαι” λαβὲ δὴ καὶ 
τὴν τοῦ ἰατροῦ µαρτυρίαν. “Μαρτυρία” 
And so take the testimony of these men, so that you may know 
that many are aware of how I was abused by these men. 
[Witnesses] And indeed also take the testimony of the doctor. 
[Witness] 
Dem. 54.12: 
λέγε τὴν τοῦ ἰατροῦ µαρτυρίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐπισκοπούντων. 
“Μαρτυρίαι”  
read the testimony of the doctor and of those who observed my 
condition. [Witnesses] 
Each instance of testimony from a doctor is probably introduced 
in this way in order to clearly identify him by his profession and 
not simply as one of the crowd of men who carried Ariston home 
or visited him in his sickness. What is the effect of this, and of the 
highlighting of the doctor as witness later in the speech at 36? 
Demosthenes clearly intended to make the most of the fact that 
the doctor was available and willing to testify, and the repetition 
of his professional status indicates the belief that this will resonate 
with the dikasts. The rhetorical effect operates on several levels. 
First, it establishes the professional knowledge and reputation of 
Ariston’s witnesses in contrast to the disreputable characters that 
Conon will produce. Second, it emphasises the lack of personal 
connection between Ariston and his doctor-witnesses. Part of the 
danger of Conon’s witnesses is that they are friends of his, and 
therefore presumably more willing to lie on his behalf. By high-
lighting that Ariston only knows these witnesses because they 
were his doctors, he suggests that they are more likely to tell the 
 
G. B. Ferngren, “The Physician as an Expert Witness in Athenian Law,” 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 51 (1977) 206–207. Even Bonner, who other-
wise doubts the presence of expert testimony in Athenian courts, calls this 
“the real beginnings of expert evidence” (80). See also Hall, BICS 40 (1995) 
53, and Humphreys, History and Anthropology 1 (1985) 327. 
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objective truth of what happened. Third, the speech anticipates 
that Conon will argue that the whole matter was trivial, that 
fighting is natural for young men, and that Ariston is blowing 
both the attack and his own injuries out of proportion (13–15). 
Ariston states near the beginning of the speech (1) that he was 
inclined to bring a more serious, public charge, but was dis-
suaded by his friends because of the danger this could pose both 
to his reputation and in the penalty he would be subject to if he 
did not receive one-fifth of the votes. By repeatedly drawing at-
tention to the doctor, Ariston reaffirms the gravity of the attack 
and its effects, complementing his strategies of characterising 
Conon and his family as habitually violent and of referring to 
the attack as hubris, a more serious offence than aikeia, the actual 
charge. The doctor’s profession is used as a repeated reminder 
of the grievous damage done to Ariston by Conon, and thus an 
encouragement to the dikasts to vote to convict him on the 
charge of assault. 
Conclusion 
A survey of the forensic uses of doctors reveals their particular 
rhetorical resonances. Many doctors are presented as trust-
worthy and competent, particularly those who appear in figura-
tive passages, where doctors become emblematic of protection 
against danger to the body and thus an easy analogy for the 
democratic forms of protection against danger to the city and 
the people that litigants regularly draw attention to. Actual 
doctors in narratives, too, can be positive figures, offering their 
professional services and even standing up against criminals, 
whether for the sake of justice or simply to protect their own 
reputations. Doctors are far from consistently portrayed in a 
positive light, however, and the more negative views range from 
the incompetent to the actively unscrupulous and seedy.  
A particularly interesting feature that emerges is that a specific 
doctor’s untrustworthiness is almost always tied to his association 
with another negatively portrayed figure, most often the 
speaker’s opponent. Demosthenes portrays Aeschines’ doctor as 
deceitful because he wishes to portray Aeschines as deceitful; a 
similar model applies to the doctors in Demosthenes 33 and 
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Aeschines 1. On the other hand, where doctors appear to be 
particularly positive, it is often due to a supporting connection 
with the speaker’s own case, as in Demosthenes 47 and the 
previous trauma charge mentioned in Demosthenes 40. There is 
very little consistency in presentation, and in short, these doctors 
are characterised as either upstanding or unscrupulous not be-
cause of any perceived professional or social status, but because 
of their rhetorical characterisation in a manner that either sup-
ports the speaker’s case or attacks that of his opponent. Almost 
as much as figurative doctors, real doctors in the courts are 
essentially the rhetorical constructions of the logographers. Even 
in cases where doctors acted as witnesses in ways that relied on 
their professional knowledge, the presentation of their profession 
could be manipulated to fit the speaker’s agenda, whether to 
emphasise expertise, objectivity, or the seriousness of the 
situation.40 
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